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Abstract 
Human reliability analyses play very important roles in safety analyses for NPP operations. However, scarcity of the basic human 
error probability data of soft control human actions has been considered as a main bottleneck for HRAs of the soft control tasks 
in NPPs. In this study, the soft control tasks are analyzed and modelled to be used for development of the basic human reliability 
data and quantification of human error probability. Sub-tasks comprising a soft control are modelled to be observable and 
distinguishable as unit tasks so that the basic human error probabilities for the sub-tasks could be observed and calculated in 
simulator-based experimental or real field operational studies. Safety-grade and non-safety grade soft controls are modelled for 
controls of safety and non-safety components, respectively. Possible error modes and propagation to another unintended control 
action, impact on soft control operation, and final error type are analyzed to provide helpful information for applications to the 
final human error quantification and reduction. Considerations are provided for the soft control models developed to be used in 
HRAs. The results of this study would be used for development of a human reliability model and basic human reliability data and 
quantification and reduction of human error probability during the soft control in various large-scale process control systems such 
as nuclear power plant (NPPs), chemical processing plants, oil processing plant, and large military systems. 
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1. Introduction 
A nuclear power plant (NPP) is operated by a shift of operators whose errors might lead to a catastrophic 
situations and hence analyses and assessments of operators’ errors have been considered very important. Especially 
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advanced digital control systems have been introduced into advanced NPPs with lots of technical advantages as 
digital technologies advance rapidly. Even though advanced digital technologies applied to advanced NPPs are 
expected to improve operators’ human performance, potential human factors issues coupled with new technologies 
might be troublesome. One of new technologies adopted in advanced NPPs is the soft control which is mediated by 
software e.g., touch screens, key board, mouse, light pens, trackballs, joysticks, and so on [1]. Operators need to 
navigate screens of digital computer based HMIs (Human-Machine Interfaces) to find indicators or controls and 
manipulate the soft controls. Due to these different interfaces, different human errors should be considered and 
analysed. Human errors with existing hard-wired controls had been studied a lot, however few studies have been 
done on the soft control in advanced control rooms (ACRs) of advanced NPPs. Especially quantification of human 
errors during the soft control has been considered as a challenge, because scarce human reliability data such as basic 
human error probabilities during soft controls have been available.  
The authors had developed human error mechanism models for the soft control in ACRs for analysis and 
enhancement of human performance during NPP operation and in addition human factors guidelines for better HMI 
design, training programs, and optimal strategies for task performance had been developed based on the developed 
human error mechanism models [2]. In this study, the soft control tasks are analyzed and modelled to be used for 
development of the basic human reliability data and quantification of human error probability during the soft control 
based on the human error mechanism models previously developed by the authors. There are safety-grade and non-
safety-grade components to be controlled in NPPs and safety-grade and non-safety grade soft controls are modelled, 
respectively. Primary and secondary tasks in ACRs are analyzed to be modelled as sub-tasks (steps) for a soft 
control task. Sub-tasks comprising a soft control are modelled to be observable and distinguishable as unit tasks so 
that the basic human error probabilities for the sub-tasks could be observed and calculated in simulator-based 
experimental or real field operational studies. Possible error modes and propagation to another unintended control 
action, impact on soft control operation, and final error type are analyzed to provide helpful information for further 
applications to the human error quantification and reduction. 
 
Nomenclature 
ACR  Advanced Control Room  
APR-1400 Advanced Power Reactor-1400 
CVCS  Chemical Volume Control System 
EOC  Error Of Commission 
EOO   Error Of Omission 
ESCM   ESF-CCS Soft Control Module 
ESF  Engineered Safety Feature 
ESF-CCS ESF Component Control System 
HMI   Human Machine Interface 
INSC  Intended NSC 
ISSC  Intended SSC 
KINS  Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety 
NPP  Nuclear Power Plant 
NSC  Non-safety-grade Soft Control 
RCS  Rod Control System 
SIS  Safety Injection System 
SSC  Safety-grade Soft Control 
UNSC  Unintended NSC 
USSC  Unintended SSC 
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2. Human error during soft control 
2.1. Soft control in APR-1400 NPPs 
Operators’ tasks in NPPs are performed through cognitive activities such as monitoring and detection, situation 
assessment, response planning, and response implementation [3]. In ACRs, the response implementation is related to 
soft control. There are two types of operators’ tasks in ACRs such as primary tasks and secondary tasks [1]. The 
primary tasks refer to control tasks to plant systems (e.g., opening/closing valves and starting/stopping pumps). The 
secondary tasks which are required to perform primary tasks; are related to the interface management (e.g., 
navigating screens and handling different types of input devices). 
The ACR in APR-1400 has been designed with digital and computer technologies. The original standard design 
of APR-1400 ACR adopted the non-safety-grade universal soft controller for safety-grade and non-safety-grade 
system controls which had been adopted in the ACR designs of N4 reactor (France) and AP 600 (the USA). 
However, the safety standard of IEEE 603 [4] requires the separation of displays required for safety system control 
from those for non-safety system control and independence among diverse channels. Hence the KINS (Korean 
regulatory body) requested the designer (or developer) to change the design of soft controller according to the 
requirements in IEEE 603. The designer (or developer) changed the design accordingly and conducted a human 
factors experimental study to verify the suitability of the revised design with various performance measures. They 
concluded that the separation design (safety-grade vs. non-safety-grade) with confirm switches (only for safety-
grade) would be most beneficial in terms of human factors [5].  
Safety-grade soft controls are designed separately and independently of non-safety-grade soft controls in APR-
1400 ACRs. The non-safety-grade soft controls are performed by selecting and clicking target components (non-
safety-grade) on the monitoring screens using a mouse, whereas the safety-grade soft control require selecting and 
clicking target components (safety-grade) on the monitoring screens using a mouse and additional operations of 
touch screen devices on independent control panels called ESF-CCS Soft Control Module (ESCM), as shown in Fig. 
1. 
Fig. 1. Safety-grade vs. Non-safety-grade soft control. 
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2.2. Human error during soft control 
There have been lots of human error taxonomies in literatures. One of them is the slip and mistake taxonomy 
which is based on consideration of intention [1]. The slip is defined as an error in implementing the intention. Thus, 
while one action is intended, another is accomplished. The mistake is defined as an error in intention formation and 
related to incorrectly assessing the situation or ineffectively planning a response.  
A lot of studies have been performed on the mistake and the slip with the hard-wired control. Existing studies on 
the mistake can be applied to the soft control in the same way applied to the hard-wired control because intention 
formation has no difference between hard-wired and soft controls. However the slip error during soft controls is 
totally different from that during hard-wired controls. In this study, only the slip error is considered for the soft 
control modelling. Another widely used taxonomy of errors in NPPs considers the operator’s actions that may 
contribute to accidents with inappropriate actions. Errors are classified into error of omission (EOO) and error of 
commission (EOC) [1]. The EOO refers to forgetting a task or sub-task, whereas the EOC represents doing the task 
incorrectly. This taxonomy is used in this study to figure out the soft control error propagation. Lee et al. (2011) 
analyzed the human errors modes during soft controls and classified the human errors modes into six types: 
operation omission (E1), wrong object (E2), wrong operation (E3), mode confusion (E4), inadequate operation (E5), 
and delayed operation (E6) [6]. 
 
 
3. Soft control modeling for human reliability analysis 
3.1. Considerations for the soft control modeling 
Conventionally the human error quantification are made by multiplying or integrating the basic human error 
probability of a target human action and evaluated weights of relevant performance shaping factors in human 
reliability analyses (HRAs) for hard-wired controls. Data for the basic human error probability for the hard-wired 
controls in NPPs have been provided in lots of the literature such as the HRA handbook in NPPs [7]. However, 
scarcity of the basic human error probability data of soft control human actions has been considered as a main 
bottleneck for HRAs of the soft control tasks in NPPs. The soft control tasks should be analyzed and modeled in a 
consistent and systematic manner in order to develop the basic human error probability data of soft control human 
actions. Data of sub-tasks of a soft control task could be observed, collected and evaluated with simulator-based 
experimental or real field operational studies to develop the basic human error probability data. Hence sub-tasks 
comprising a soft control should be modelled to be observable and distinguishable as unit tasks so that the basic 
human error probabilities for the sub-tasks could be observed and calculated. Another important aim of HRAs is to 
identify the impact of human errors and provide countermeasures for human error reduction. In order to facilitate 
these, possible error modes and propagation to another unintended control action, impact on soft control operation, 
and final error type should be included in the modeling. 
3.2. Soft control task analysis and modeling 
The soft control tasks in APR-1400 ACRs consist of several secondary tasks (interface control tasks) such as 
scanning and selecting relevant window containing a target control devise and scanning and selecting the target 
control device within the selected window and primary tasks (plant system control tasks) such as controlling the 
target control device. Especially for safety-grade soft controls primary tasks are performed on a separate and 
independent ESCM with additional secondary task such as pushing the confirm switch located immediately above 
the ESCM as shown in Fig. 1. Human errors of soft controls are basically associated with the failure of a primary 
task. Even though one or more of the secondary tasks failed in a soft control task, if they are recovered in a timely 
manner, the final primary task can be successful. A failure or failures of relevant secondary tasks lead to the failure 
of a primary task if recovery action (s) to the failure (s) of the secondary tasks is (are) not successful. In order to 
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develop the soft control model for HRAs, primary and secondary tasks in ACRs are analyzed to be categorized into 
observable sub-tasks for a soft control task.  
3.3. Safety-grade soft control modeling 
The Safety-grade Soft Controls (SSCs) are generally required during an abnormal or emergency situation in 
NPPs for which engineered safety feature (ESF) systems are designed to provide safety functions. ESF systems 
consist of various ESF components such as pumps, valves, and so on which are controlled by relevant SSCs. As 
modeled in Fig. 2, the SSCs are performed through a series of combination of secondary and primary tasks. Firstly 
the window which has the target control component which controls relevant ESF component must be scanned and 
selected (which are secondary tasks). A lot of sub-systems are designed in a NPP such as RCS (Rod Control 
System), CVCS (Chemical Volume Control System), SIS (Safety Injection System), and so on. A lot of windows for 
each or some of components of the sub-systems are designed on HMIs in ACRs. Operators have to select relevant 
windows to do required tasks. Secondly the target control component on the window must be scanned and selected 
for controlling the target ESF component (secondary tasks). After selecting the relevant window, the relevant 
control component to the ESF component to be controlled have to be found out and selected among lots of control 
components within the window. If the target control device is selected (clicked), attention should be paid to the 
ESCM located below the screen which has the control window (secondary tasks) as shown in Fig. 1. Thirdly the 
confirm switch should be pushed to confirm the relevant control device is selected correctly (secondary tasks). ESF 
systems generally have redundant trains which have the same function to increase the reliability of ESF systems. In 
APR-1400 they have four redundant trains for ESF systems and hence operators have to push the relevant confirm 
switch of train to the ESF component to be controlled. Finally the ESF component is controlled by controlling the 
target control component on the ESCM (primary task). 
The SSC is modeled as a four-step process (see Fig. 2) in this study each step of which is modeled to be 
observable and distinguishable as follows: 
z ܵܵܥூିௐ  : SSC sub-task of Interface control of relevant Window selection 
z ܵܵܥூିௐതതതതതതതതതത : Failure of ܵܵܥூିௐ 
z ܵܵܥூିௐோ  : Recovery from ܵܵܥூିௐതതതതതതതതതത 
z ܵܵܥூି஼ : SSC sub-task of Interface control of relevant Component selection 
z ܵܵܥூି஼തതതതതതതതത : Failure of ܵܵܥூି஼  
z ܵܵܥூି஼ோ  : Recovery from ܵܵܥூି஼തതതതതതതതത 
z ܵܵܥூିௌ : SSC sub-task of Interface control of pushing relevant confirm Switch 
z ܵܵܥூିௌതതതതതതതതത : Failure of ܵܵܥூିௌ 
z ܵܵܥூିௌோ  : Recovery from ܵܵܥூିௌതതതതതതതതത 
z ܵܵܥ௉ି஼ : SSC sub-task of Plant system control of relevant Component on ESCM 
z ܵܵܥ௉ି஼തതതതതതതതത : Failure of ܵܵܥ௉ି஼ 
z ܵܵܥ௉ି஼ோ  : Recovery from ܵܵܥ௉ି஼തതതതതതതതത 
z ISSC : Intended SSC 
z തതതതതത  : Failure of ISSC 
z USSC  : Unintended SSC 
z UNSC : Unintended NSC  
z EOC : Error of Commission 
z EOO : Error of Omission 
The best sequence for the success of a SSC task would be definitely the case where all the sub-tasks have been 
performed successfully without any failure and recovery. Even though any one or more of SSC sub-tasks fail(s), the 
SSC task can be successful if it is (or they are) recovered in a timely manner. The worst sequence for the success of 
a SSC task would be the case where all the sub-tasks have failed and recovered in an appropriate time interval. The 
possible error modes and propagation to another unintended control action, impact on the SSC operation, and final 
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error type in terms of EOO and EOC are analyzed in Table 1, which is expected to be effectively used for the human 
error quantification and reduction. 
 
Fig. 2. Modeling of Safety-grade Soft Control (SSC). 
3.4. Non-safety-grade soft control modeling 
The Non-safety-grade Soft Control (NSC) is modeled in the similar way to the SSC except for the separate and 
independent control with the ESCM. The NSC is required in all the NPP operating modes for which operating 
systems but safety-related systems are designed to provide general functions for the NPP operation. As modeled in 
Fig. 3, the NSCs are performed through a series of combination of secondary and primary tasks. Firstly the window 
which has the target control component which controls a general plant component must be scanned and selected 
(secondary tasks). A lot of windows for each or some of components of general sub-systems are designed on HMIs 
in ACRs. Operators have to select relevant windows to do required tasks. Secondly the target control component on 
the target window must be scanned and selected for controlling the general plant component (secondary tasks). A 
pop-up control window is generated on the target window. Finally the general plant component is controlled by 
controlling the target control component on a pop-up window (primary task).  
The NSC is modelled as a three-step process (see Fig. 3) each step of which is modeled to be observable and 
distinguishable as follows: 
z ܰܵܥூିௐ : NSC sub-task of Interface control of relevant Window selection 
z ܰܵܥூିௐതതതതതതതതതത : Failure of ܰܵܥூିௐ 
z ܰܵܥூିௐோ  : Recovery from ܰܵܥூିௐതതതതതതതതതത  
z ܰܵܥூି஼ : NSC sub-task of Interface control of relevant Component selection 
z ܰܵܥூି஼തതതതതതതതതത : Failure of ܰܵܥூି஼ 
z ܰܵܥூି஼ோ  : Recovery from ܰܵܥூି஼തതതതതതതതതത 
z ܰܵܥ௉ି஼ : NSC sub-task of Plant system control of relevant Component on pop-up window 
z ܰܵܥ௉ି஼തതതതതതതതതത : Failure of ܰܵܥ௉ି஼ 
z ܰܵܥ௉ି஼ோ  : Recovery from ܰܵܥ௉ି஼തതതതതതതതതത 
z INSC : Intended NSC 
z INSCതതതതതതത : Failure of INSC 
z USSC  : Unintended SSC 
z UNSC : Unintended NSC  
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The best sequence for the success of a NSC task would be the case where all the sub-tasks have been performed 
successfully without any failure and recovery. Similar to the SSC task, even though a failure happens (or some 
failures happen) during NSC sub-tasks, the NSC task might be successful if it is (or they are) recovered in an 
appropriate time interval. The worst sequence for the success of a NSC task would be the case where all the sub-
tasks have been failed and recovered in an appropriate time interval. The possible error modes and propagation to 
another unintended control action, impact on the NSC operation, and final error type in terms of EOO and EOC are 
analyzed in Table 2.  
Fig. 3. Modeling of Non-safety-grade Soft Control (NSC). 
Table 1. Analyses of possible error mode, propagation, impact, and type of safety-grade soft control (SSC) sub-tasks. 
SSC 
Sub-task 
Possible Error Mode 
Possible Error Propagation to 
Another Control Action 
Impact on Operation 
Error 
Type 
I-W 
E1 : operation omission No propagation ISSC failed EOO 
E2 : wrong window selection E2 : wrong component operation USSC or UNSC done EOC 
E6 : too late operation No propagation 
ISSC delayed if 
recovered 
EOC 
I-C 
E1 : operation omission No propagation ISSC failed EOO 
E2 : wrong component selection E2 : wrong component operation USSC or UNSC done EOC 
E6 : too late operation No propagation 
ISSC delayed if 
recovered 
EOC 
I-S 
E1 : operation omission No propagation ISSC failed EOO 
E2 : wrong switch selection E2 : wrong component operation USSC done EOC 
E6 : too late operation No propagation 
ISSC delayed if 
recovered 
EOC 
P-C 
E1 : operation omission No propagation ISSC failed EOO 
E3 : wrong operation No propagation ISSC failed EOC 
E5 : inadequate operation 
(1) too long/short 
(2) too much/little 
(3) Mistimed 
(4) incomplete 
No propagation ISSC failed EOC 
E6 : too late operation No propagation 
ISSC delayed if 
recovered 
EOC 
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              Table 2. Analyses of possible error mode, propagation, impact, and type of non-safety-grade soft control (NSC) sub-tasks. 
NSC 
Sub-task 
Possible Error Mode Possible Error Propagation to Another Control Action Impact on Operation 
Error 
Type 
I-W 
E1 : operation omission No propagation INSC failed EOO 
E2 : wrong window selection E2 : wrong component operation USSC or UNSC done EOC 
E6 : too late operation No propagation INSC delayed if recovered EOC 
I-C 
E1 : operation omission No propagation INSC failed EOO 
E2 : wrong component selection E2 : wrong component operation USSC or UNSC done EOC 
E6 : too late operation No propagation INSC delayed if recovered EOC 
P-C 
E1 : operation omission No propagation INSC failed EOO 
E3 : wrong operation No propagation INSC failed EOC 
E5 : inadequate operation 
(1) too long/short 
(2) too much/little 
(3) Mistimed 
(4) incomplete 
No propagation INSC failed EOC 
E6 : too late operation No propagation INSC delayed if recovered EOC 
 
4. Considerations for use of Soft Control Models in HRAs 
The soft control models are developed in this study so that they can be used for HRAs. Firstly, the models can be 
used to develop a human reliability model. A single soft control action can be performed successfully in a variety of 
ways, as can be seen in Fig.3 and 4. The success paths include the best case without any failure and recovery in the 
sub-tasks, the cases having several failures and recoveries in some of the sub-tasks, and the worst case with every 
sub-task failed and recovered. The failure paths are also included in the soft control models. Hence they can be used 
for the development of a reliability model of a single soft control action. Secondly, if a reliability model for a soft 
control action has been developed, the basic human error probability data modeled in the reliability model should be 
observed and evaluated in simulator-based experimental or real field operational studies. Failure data during sub-
tasks of soft control tasks should be observed and recorded in a very-well controlled experimental environment and 
an appropriate probability distribution model for the evaluation of the basic human error probability should be 
selected considering assumptions that must be satisfied for the probability model to hold. During the experimental 
studies the assumptions coupled with the probability model should be tested and verified. Finally, the models should 
be used for PSFs (Performance Shaping Factors) evaluation for the final human error quantification [8]. The sub-
tasks identified, possible error modes, error propagation to another control action, and impact on operation should be 
analyzed in a comprehensive way to evaluate weights of PSFs for the human error quantification. Operators’ 
behavior observation and analysis techniques including eye tracking systems might be a great option for the 
development of basic human error probabilities [9]. 
5. Conclusions and further study 
Scarcity of basic human error probability data of soft control human actions has been considered as a main 
bottleneck for HRAs of the soft control tasks in NPPs. In this study, soft control tasks in NPPs have been modeled 
for the HRAs considering primary and secondary tasks in ACRs. The models include the safety-grade soft control 
(SSC) model with a four-step process and the Non-safety-grade soft control (NSC) model with a three-step process. 
These steps (sub-tasks) were modeled to be observable and distinguishable so that basic human error probability 
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data could be observed and calculated in simulator-based experimental or real field operational studies. Possible 
error modes and propagation to another unintended control action, impact on soft control operation, and final error 
type have been analyzed to provide helpful information for further applications to the human error quantification 
and reduction. The results of this study are expected to be used for development of a human reliability model for a 
soft control task and relevant basic human error probability data and quantification of final human error probabilities 
with evaluation of PSFs in various large-scale process control systems such as nuclear power plant (NPPs), chemical 
processing plants, oil processing plant, and large military systems. As further studies a mathematical reliability 
model for the soft control will be studied, which will be followed by a simulator-based experimental study for 
collecting and evaluating basic human error probabilities of sub-tasks of the soft controls in ACRs. 
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